Call for contributions,
   Workshop on Intrusion Tolerant Systems

Carl Landwehr and Steven Bellovin
Workshop on Intrusion Tolerant Systems
DSN 2002

Call for Contributions
Workshop on Intrusion Tolerant Systems

For many years, the dominant approach to providing computing resources in an
environment where attacks are expected was to prevent the anticipated attack
from penetrating the boundary of the trusted part of the system. This
approach required system designers and implementers to go to great lengths
to avoid security flaws.
Today's systems are overwhelmingly built on low cost commercial quality
systems that are guaranteed to include flaws, some of which will be security
flaws. Since eliminating such flaws has proven practically impossible, a
way must be found to build systems that can continue critical operations
even if an attack exploits a system flaw. We need to find not hack-proof
systems, but systems that can cope with the failure, under attack, of some
Researchers in France and Britain began to explore concepts of what today
would be called intrusion tolerant systems in the mid to late 1980's. More
recently, The US National Research Council's report "Trust in Cyberspace"
called for exploration of architectures that would permit trustworthy
systems to be constructed of untrustworthy components. DARPA's programs in
Intrusion Tolerant Systems and Organically Assured Survivable Information
Systems (OASIS) have sparked new efforts in the area, as has the European
MAFTIA (Malicious and Accidental Fault Tolerance for Internet Applications)
The purpose of this workshop is to provide a forum for researchers to report
recent results in Intrusion Tolerant Systems and to demonstrate prototype
systems that incorporate intrusion tolerance. Short papers, work-in-progress
reports, position papers, panel proposals, and demonstrations are solicited
that address the problem of stating requirements for intrusion tolerant
systems, methods for designing and implementing systems that can meet
requirements for intrusion tolerance, and methods for demonstrating that a
system in fact meets such requirements.
Accepted workshop contributions (written material) will be published in the
Supplement of the 2002 International Conference on Dependable Systems and
Please submit all contributions to

Steven Bellovin

Carl Landwehr
Mitretek, USA

Program Committee
Badger, Lee (NAI, USA)
Chandersekaran, Sekar (Microsoft, USA)
Dacier, Marc (IBM-Zurich, Switzerland)
Deswarte, Yves (LAAS-CNRS, France)
Heimerdinger, Walt (Honeywell, USA)
McGraw, Gary (Cigital, USA)
Reiter, Mike (Lucent, USA)
Schneider, Fred (Cornell Univ., USA)
Venema, Wietse (IBM-Watson, USA)

Submission: January 14, 2002
Notification: March 11, 2002